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Abstract: This paper argues that postmodern approaches to 
anthropology typically display certain characteristic logical 
errors and are based on questionable assumptions about human 
thought and desire.  Further, the liberationist moral stance 
taken in postmodern discourse tends toward the excesses 
diagnosed by Hegel as `the law of the heart', that is, a 
romantic solipsism that ignores the ambiguity and limits of 
human existence.  The moral and theoretical problems of 
postmodernism are linked to the anomie of contemporary society, 
which presses beleaguered intellectuals toward privileging 
interpretivist modes of thought. The article concludes by 
questioning the emancipating potential of postmodern theory that 
places imagination at the center of anthropological inquiry, and 
argues instead for a reconsideration of the fundamental 
constraints and potentials of the human condition. 
`All our dignity consists, then, in thought.  By it we must 
elevate ourselves, and not by space and time which we cannot 
fill.  Let us endeavour, then, to think well; this is the 
principle of morality' (Pascal 1941:116). 
  
 Every field of science passes through intellectual phases, 
and anthropology - always deeply ambiguous and anxious about the 
nature of its knowledge base - has been more susceptible to fads 
than any other.  But what is unusual in the current postmodern 
trend is its denial of the groundings of the discipline itself - 
a radical critique that has bewildered and confused many 
ordinary workers in the field, who are dismayed by the blizzard 
of references to literary scholars, rhetoricians and French 
philosophers which inundate contemporary anthropological 
publications. Theoreticians of more orthodox bent have tried to 
hold the fort against the rising storm.  Reyna, for instance, 
has forcefully demonstrated that postmodern dismissals of 
science are ignorant of scientific method and are based on logic 
that is post hoc and ad hominem (1994).  Pursuing another line 
of defense, Adam Kuper (1994) has shown the fallacies of the 
postmodern assumption that ethnography can only be conducted 
from the inside out, and has called for anthropologists to move 
away from literary models toward more sociological types of 
analysis. Elsewhere, Gellner (1992) has spiritedly argued that 
postmodern rests more on wishful thinking and rhetorical excess 
than solid research.   
 In this article, I will follow in this debunking tradition, 
using material from a few typical articles by recent 
anthropological practitioners of postmodernism to outline some 
of their characteristic arguments. Then I will show some logical 
quandaries that are implicit in these claims.  This is 
straightforward enough, but what I wish to do next is perhaps 
more unusual; that is, to consider the moral stance implicitly 
or explicitly presented by these theorists.  This has 
ramifications that are problematic in the extreme, as I will 
show, relying primarily on Hegel's (1967 - original publication 
1807) dissection of the `law of the heart' for my critique. 
Next, I employ Durkheim's concept of anomie as a key to an 
understanding of the source of the postmodern trend in 
anthropology, and conclude by calling into question the 
liberating potential of a theory that places imagination at the 
center of the anthropological endeavor.  
The Postmodern Claim 
 One standard argument made by postmodernists opposes the 
`essentializing' of categories - especially the categories used 
by anthropologists in their study of culture. As I have written 
elsewhere (Lindholm 1995), this radical critique of traditional 
anthropology has been taken to its logical end point by Abu-
Lughod, who proposes that the very notion of culture should be 
discarded, since its use must inevitably  
`make these "Others" seem simultaneously more coherent, 
self-contained and different from ourselves than they might 
be.... This in turn allows for the fixing of boundaries 
between self and other' (Abu-Lughod 1993: 7). 
She argues further that the self-other distinction  
`will always be hierarchical because the self is sensed as 
primary, self-formed, active, and complex, if not positive.  
At the very least, the self is always the interpreter and 
the other the interpreted' (Abu-Lughod 1993: 13).  
 Influenced deeply by the anti-Imperialist and anti-Orientalist 
rhetoric of Said (1979), Abu-Lughod suggests that it is 
destructive, oppressive and wrong to typify other persons as 
having a distinct cultural heritage which can be studied, 
grasped and compared, or even, it seems, to imagine others as 
separate from ourselves.  Instead, she calls on anthropologists 
to write against generalization and to reveal, through multiple 
narratives, how `people strategize, feel pain,contest 
interpretations of what is happening - in short, live their 
lives' (Abu-Lughod 1993: 14).  Narrative accounts of ordinary 
existence are better - more true and more moral - than any 
theoretical formula or comparative claim. 
 If Abu-Lughod is correct in stating that the concept of culture 
is in its very essence immoral and hegemonic, it follows then 
that the training and accreditation of anthropologists as 
professionals who have acquired the capacity to interpret 
cultures are equally immoral and hegemonic. The most rigorous 
postmodernist writers follow this logic, and condemn 
disciplinary procedures for promoting specialized professional 
knowledge - even though they thereby erode their own positions 
as teachers, writers and researchers.   
 It seems then that for the most consistent of postmodern 
writers, academically trained anthropologists who follow 
accepted professional practice are necessarily guilty of 
aggression, elitism, inhumanity, polarization and a lack of 
creativity.  Moreover, their work is censured as irredeemably 
flawed because their claims to knowledge derive from an outmoded 
Enlightenment project that wrongly assumes the capacity of 
detached reason and objective analysis to reveal the underlying 
patterns of human actions and beliefs. In the archetypical 
postmodern reading i, such analysis is revealed to be not the 
search for truth it pretends to be, but rather a mask hiding the 
reality of power-seeking and self-aggrandizement on the part of 
the analyst, who dominates and oppresses those analyzed.  
Anthropological theory is therefore to be understood as simply 
one amongst an infinite variety of epistemic systems marshalled 
for the legitimization of power, and its claims to superior 
insight are false, as well as imperialist and authoritarian.  At 
best, its practitioners are dupes, fooled into believing in the 
scientific value of a knowledge system that actually serves to 
enslave and objectify others; at worst they are hypocrites, who 
hide from themselves and their `subjects' the desire for 
domination that actually animates their research. 
  The more correct path then is to accept and embrace the 
relative nature of truth as a multiple product of the 
imaginative perceptions and interpretations of equal and 
creative individuals, with no privileged space for the analyses 
of the anthropological researcher. This is the position 
tentatively taken by Geertz in a famous essay (1984) and then 
wholeheartedly embraced and expanded in Clifford and Marcus's 
seminal postmodernist collection (1986).  There, in his 
influential programmatic statement, Rabinow says that the 
postmodernist author must be  
`so committed to a doctrine of partiality and flux for 
which even such things as one's own situation are so 
unstable, so without identity, that they cannot serve as 
objects of sustained reflection' (Rabinow 1986: 252).   
Quoting Clifford, Rabinow notes with satisfaction that in this 
giddy whirl of shifting boundaries and multiple voices, 
ethnography will be `invaded by heteroglossia' which will 
provide `a utopia of plural authorship' where the anthropologist 
is merely one among many independent voices, none any more (or 
less) convincing than the rest. (Rabinow 1986: 286). ii   
 The characteristic postmodern argument for relativism has been 
perhaps most cogently and comprehensively stated in a series of 
articles by Shweder, an influential figure in psychological 
anthropology.  Following his reading of the philosopher Nelson 
Goodman (1972), Shweder argues that there can be no a priori way 
to give preference to any attribute of an object over any other 
attribute, nor is there in principle a limit to the number of 
attributes any object may be said to reveal or contain.  In this 
wide sense `all things are equally alike and equally different' 
(Shweder 1984: 41), because they all have an infinite number of 
attributes.  It follows that it is the way these attributes are 
perceived and coded by the observer that gives an object its 
supposed reality.  But the nature of any codification is also 
potentially infinite.  Therefore,`there are as many realities as 
there are ways "it" can be constituted or described' (Shweder 
and Miller 1991: 156); and because realities are ineluctably 
multiple there can be `no standards worthy of universal respect 
dictating what to think or how to act' (Shweder 1984: 47) iii.  
Following this chain of reasoning, Shweder concludes: 
`We may well live in a world where from a logical point of 
view all things are equally alike and equally different, a 
world where all previous events are necessary and none is 
sufficient to cause a subsequent event, a world where the 
best logical advice you can give a friend is that if you 
don't know where you are going almost any road will take 
you there.' (Shweder 1984: 41).   
 What is significant is Shweder's effort to link his relativizing 
and deconstructive project to a search for a higher spiritual 
reality.  This transcendentalizing tendency is not atypical in 
postmodern circles - recall the evocation of `utopia' in 
Rabinow's quotation from Clifford - and indeed it may be a 
necessary psychological consequence of imagining oneself to be 
living in a world where `everything is equally alike and equally 
different'.  But Shweder makes his argument more definite and 
therefore more easily debated than the often fuzzy discourse of 
many other postmodern authors.  He achieves this clarity by 
specifically paralleling postmodern anthropology to the 
eighteenth century Romantic effort to break away from the 
scientific rationality of the Enlightenment in order to move 
beyond the limits of the mundane world and to reach a higher 
level of consciousness.  Postmodernism, he says, is the new 
expression of this powerful and liberating romantic inclination.  
He states his case as follows:  
`The whole thrust of romantic thinking is to defend the 
coequality of fundamentally different "frames" of 
understanding.  The concept of nonrationality, the idea of 
the "arbitrary", frees some portion of man's mind from the 
universal dictates of logic and science, permitting 
diversity while leaving man free to choose among 
irreconcilable presuppositions, schemes of classification, 
and ideas of worth.' (Shweder 1984: 48).    
 According to Shweder, by allowing its acolytes to realize the 
arbitrary nature of reality, and to cross boundaries into the 
imaginary worlds they wish to live in, postmodernism has given 
them access to a higher plane of knowledge, forbidden to 
ordinary people who are locked in the chains of their own 
culture-bound perceptions.  
`Transcendence and self-transformation are possible but 
only through a dialectical process of moving from one 
intentional world into the next, or by changing one 
intentional world into another' (Shweder 1991: 99).   
The ideal anthropologist is an `artful realist' who can 
accomplish the task of shape-shifting across cultures, realize 
that all truth is partial, and be freed from the constraints of 
reality as it is ordinarily understood. Postmodernism then is a 
kind of carnival, iv where adepts play games with tropes and 
signifiers in a world that is endlessly malleable and open to 
those lucky few who have the proper non-judgmental credentials. 
 Shweder's ploy of using the very paradigm-questioning logic 
promoted by the Enlightenment to demonstrate the fragility of 
the Enlightenment project itself is nothing new.  This move has 
a long intellectual history, and is perhaps best associated with 
Pascal and Hume.  But they had different ends in mind than those 
espoused by postmodern theorists.  Pascal, by questioning the 
power of abstract reason, hoped to frighten his readers back to 
the verities of faith.  Hume, in contrast, pleaded for a 
government that could adequately control and channel the 
irrational passions of its citizenry. What is truly new is that 
neither of these are credible options for postmodernists, who 
repudiate both traditional faith and state power as unwarranted 
limitations on what they value most: total freedom and 
creativity as absolute goods.  In this, they resemble their 
great precursor, Nietzsche. v 
 The amorphous universe of postmodern liberty sounds rather 
threatening to those timid souls who may want reliable road 
signs to guide them when they venture out into a capricious and 
arbitrary universe where everything is equally alike and equally 
different.  But not to worry: even if we do not know where we 
are going or why, and even if the signals are continually 
changing, we do know the right way to behave en route. Certain 
moral precepts - at minimum the absolute demand not to accept 
absolutes (Nietzsche's transvaluation of all values - even the 
value of truth itself) - are generally taken as given by 
postmodernists. But very un-Nietzschean indeed is the liberal 
egalitarianism also taken for granted by postmodernists, who 
tend to assume without question that we should not judge others 
or impose domination, distinction and hierarchy on them.  Such 
judgements and impositions, it is presumed,  would immorally 
limit the powers of others who have agendas equally as valid as 
our own. Within those accepted, though rarely analyzed, ethical 
constraints, the job of the postmodern researcher, as a 
psychologist closely associated with postmodern social theory 
writes, is to  
`play at the margins of the acceptable - unsettling and 
reconstituting the language of representation so as to 
undermine the traditions and carve out a new domain of 
intelligibility....  In this context erosion and 
emancipation are close companions' (Gergen 1990: 590-1).    
 Postmodernists therefore are not merely theorists or 
researchers.  They are engaged in a far more serious business: 
the liberation of human consciousness.  By taking over the role 
formerly held by now discredited Marxists in leading the 
struggle to break asunder the fetters of the past in order to 
maximize human freedom and creativity, the postmodern social 
scientist, and especially the anthropologist (whose own world 
view has already been challenged and `relativized' by cross-
cultural experience), takes the lead.  But where the Marxists 
wished to change the concrete relations of production, 
postmodernists attack the social production of significance, 
undermining epistemic hegemony by inventing oppositional and 
corrosive meaning systems.   
 This is accomplished not by battles in the streets, but by 
heroic acts of (re)interpretation.  Of course, these acts of 
interpretation must be personal and subjective, since, according 
to the premises of this school, interpretation in principle 
cannot be grounded on any `objective' reality, and therefore 
must emanate from one's own individual insight; nor can 
theoretical discourse refer to or be drawn from the ethnographic 
material itself (that would be an assertion of the analyst's 
authoritative power over the other), but can only be directed 
negatively against the dominating practices of Western cultural 
authority and positively toward the most appropriate ways to 
present the liberating multiplicity of the human experience.    
 A convincing (if obscure) literary style is a prerequisite for 
this effort, since, as one practitioner puts it, `facts are not 
separable from their literary embodiment.  Rather, their very 
"factness" derives from the way in which they are related' 
(Burke 1993: 6). vi   Rhetorical skill, regardless of the 
material being described, therefore becomes mandatory for 
effective research, and ethnography is reckoned worthwhile 
insofar as it exemplifies the free play of the imagination of 
the author while simultaneously proclaiming the essential 
humanity of the Other.  This can be done by means of selectively 
recording narrative, or through expressive novelistic 
techniques, or by introspective analysis of the ethnographer's 
own responses to the fieldwork situation, or by quoting recent 
literary criticism, or by a combination of these and other 
techniques to produce writings that, however opaque, somehow 
`challenge the capacity of anthropological generalizations to 
render lives, theirs or others, adequately'  (Abu-Lughod 1993: 
xvi).  
 What is the upshot of this effort?  Rosaldo is typical of 
postmodern anthropologists in his idealistic hope that these new 
methods will produce polyglot anthropological texts celebrating 
`new forms of human understanding' where `nothing is thrust out, 
the good the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing 
abandoned' (Rosaldo 1989: 216).  Within this inclusive and 
nonjudgemental creative genre, people will not be objectified 
and dehumanized but revealed `as playful persona whose whimsical 
fantasies join together old things in new ways.... crisscrossed 
by multiple identities' (Rosaldo 1989: 216).  As a result, a 
new, more open and humane anthropology will blossom - a carnival 
discipline where sportive identity transformations are de 
rigueur among fun-loving anthropologists and their equally 
entertaining subjects. 
Some Logical Problems of Postmodernism 
 What is wrong with the picture of anthropology presented by 
these postmodern authors?  Aside from rhetorical excess, a lot.  
For instance, consider the quandaries that must follow if we 
take seriously the postmodern call for the disintegration of all 
boundaries (including the boundary between self and other), and 
the elimination of all judgements.  If such a disintegration 
were humanly or linguistically possible (which it patently is 
not), it is hardly evident that the results would be appreciated 
or desired by the others whom we wish to dissolve: would they in 
fact want to deny their own separate cultural identities and 
ours, hegemonic though these identities may be? It is also not 
the case that differences and values are always felt to be 
invidious or that hierarchy is always regarded as evil.  Nor is 
it possible to discuss or even imagine any moral position 
whatsoever if discrimination, comparison and categorization are 
condemned as invalid.  This very censure itself rests on an 
implicit distinction from and comparison to an ideal world 
pictured as without distinctions, comparisons and 
categorizations.   In fact, it is painfully evident that we can 
no more disintegrate the difference between self and other or 
eliminate judgement than we can think without language, and 
therefore, as Clifford reluctantly admits, we `cannot yet do 
without' the notion of culture (Clifford 1988: 10).  Nor, 
despite Clifford's hopeful `yet', is it likely that a sense of 
cultural distinctiveness ever vanish among the the people whom 
anthropologists study.  And once the concepts of culture and of 
distinction have been admitted, then generalization, 
typification and comparison must necessarily follow, whatever 
idealistic visions are afloat among academics anxious to deny 
their own disciplinary precepts.   
 Similar problems plague the postmodern hope of achieving a kind 
of transcendence by `constantly moving from one objective world 
to the next, inside and then out, outside and then in, all the 
while standing back and trying to make sense of the whole 
journey' (Shweder 1991: 68).  This mystical aspiration is based 
on a premise of open and limitless choice in a universe where 
all things are `equally alike and equally different'.  But the 
absence of significant distinctions that is postulated exists 
only in the one-sided realm of a purely formal philosophy which 
privileges linguistic categories and intellectual abstraction, 
while for ordinary human beings understanding of what is most 
crucial in daily life is decidedly not arbitrary, but is always 
a result of existential givens.  As an example, a hammer can be 
described in a million ways, but what it is for us in its use is 
another matter entirely, and is realized when it is seized 
intuitively as an object `ready to hand'. vii  Even across 
cultures, it does not take much effort for someone who has never 
seen a hammer to quickly grasp, in a literal sense, its proper 
function.   
 Of course, it could be argued in response that there are an 
infinity of possible uses that might be intuited for any object. 
In principle, a hammer could be a wall decoration.  Similarly, 
it is clear that what is important and noticed about an object 
varies according to circumstances. For example, the salient 
feature for the person being chased by a tiger is its jaws; the 
apple is delicious for the hungry.  But after escaping the tiger 
and after eating the apple a realignment of perception is 
likely.  The tiger's eye or the apple's redness now may be the 
features most likely to be described.   
 Yet a contextual shift in discriptors does not prove Shweder's 
point, since only those aspects of a thing that have deeply 
concerned us in an encounter are central to our classification 
of the object; these aspects are primary in our definition, 
while other attributes are secondary.  Some objects - like 
shelter, clothing, simple tools, for example - are immediately 
understood for what they are, while others (like angry tigers) 
that threaten our lives or (like delicious fruits) can assuage 
our hunger also clearly have a motivated existential priority, 
easily and immediately grasped when conditions require 
recognition. viii  The forms of these objects may vary greatly, 
but only within the range of their significance to us; nor are 
they `equally alike and equally different' in any except the 
most abstract and meaningless sense.  Try using a shirt to 
plough a field, or taking shelter beneath a digging stick, or 
stroking an angry tiger, or using an apple for building block.   
 Now, if this is so of our relationship to significant objects, 
it is even more true of what Heidegger calls our being-in-the-
world, as all human beings are inevitably and everywhere 
motivated by the existential reality of death, the problem of 
finding meaning in life, and especially by the demands and 
constraints set by equally self-aware persons whose desires and 
fears are as compelling for them as our own are for us.  Above 
all else, they are the capitalized Others - both generalized and 
specific - from whom we must distinguish ourselves and to whom 
we must relate ourselves.  Our confrontation with these 
distinctive and active others provides the fundamental tension 
of human life, as we recognize ourselves in their eyes, yet also 
find our self-certainty challenged by their autonomy.  `The 
determinate form of this process of relating,' Hegel writes, `is 
knowledge' (1967: 139).   Such knowledge, though infinitely 
varied, is hardly indiscriminate and unmotivated, nor does it 
float free of typification and analysis.  The task of 
anthropologists, it would seem to me, must be the relatively 
modest one of discovering the possible range and content of 
these existential relationships - a discovery that can only be 
made by empirical research into the values and priorities 
motivating other cultures - and our own. 
    So far I have argued that postmodernism, despite brave 
oratory, stands on shaky logical ground.  However, this 
inadequacy is not fatal.  Social science practitioners rarely 
take serious account of the bases of their first premises, and 
the logic used to develop these premises is usually not very 
rigorous.  What is important is that new theories provide a 
novel and productive means of describing and understanding about 
the actual processes of social life.  It is true that 
postmodernism has led, in the worst cases, to self-indulgent 
personal accounts, to `epistemological hypochondria' (Geertz 
1988: 71) and to a kind of journalistic anthropology in which 
both theory and data are eschewed in favor of self-
congratulatory rhetorical flourishes. But the best practitioners 
have paid needed attention to previously ignored alternative 
narratives and have developed a healthy critical stance toward 
the validity of anthropological research.  These are 
constructive contributions, worth emulating. 
Moral Paradoxes and `The Law of the Heart'  
  What is really wrong with the picture of the world 
presented by postmodernists is the moral perspective that stands 
at the core of the postmodern project. Typically, as I have 
tried to illustrate, postmodernists take it for granted that 
creativity and freedom of the imagination are ultimate virtues 
to be maximized. In so doing they accept the central values of 
the Enlightenment world they seek to displace.  It was Kant, 
after all, who called for a rigorous overturning of the 
intellectual authority of tradition in favor of maximizing the 
creativity of the individual - sapere aude (`dare to be wise') 
was the warcry of the Enlightenment. But although romantic 
postmodernism shares Kant's ambition, it lacks the faith in 
reason (not to mention the religious belief) that gave Kant his 
moorings.  For postmodern thinkers, the anchor of the active 
intellect and the role of God-given limits have been replaced by 
a quest for transcendence through aesthetic appreciation - a 
turn toward play and imagination that threatens to disintegrate 
the study of external reality in an unbounded realm of personal 
interpretation.  Within this universe of expressive 
subjectivity, everything ceases to be different, and is likely 
instead to become the same - namely, a reflection of the 
momentary mood and taste of the viewer.  This paradox has been 
satirized by Hegel as `the abyss of vacuity.... the night in 
which, as we say, all cows are black' (Hegel 1967: 79).   
 The postmodern critique therefore celebrates with enthusiasm a 
situation that it is not at all clear we ought to applaud.  
Motivated by a laudable zeal to realize the potential of the 
individual as a creative and autonomous actor, postmodernist 
theorists have imagined a world of infinite possibilities, where 
the creative anthropologist enjoys the pleasure of trying on and 
taking off cultural masks at will. As Shweder writes, in this 
happy place  
`polytheism is alive and well. Its doctrine is the 
relativistic idea of multiple objective worlds, and its 
commandment is participation in the never-ending process of 
overcoming partial views'....`The challenge is always to 
feel eager to move on to some other worldview' (1991: 68, 
66).   
But once all the masks are off, where is the actor?  And how 
does this tenuous figure decide which mask to wear next?  These 
questions are not addressed by Shweder or other postmodernists, 
yet they lie at the moral heart of their enterprize. 
 The emancipatory worldview articulated by postmodern thinkers 
has already been analyzed by Hegel, who termed it the `law of 
the heart'; that is, a faith in the transformative power of 
personal imagination and feeling.  He understood this view to be 
characteristic of the mystical Romantic school that I, following 
Shweder, believe to be the underlying faith that animates the 
relativistic and protean postmodern impulse. ix  According to 
Hegel, those carried away by this Romantic vision see the world 
as unjust insofar as it constrains and distorts the full 
expression of the imaginative feeling self. The actual content 
of that expression, as noted above, cannot be defined - it is 
simply an expansion, `a never-ending process of overcoming 
partial views' (Shweder 1991:68), accompanied by a dissolution 
of all distinctions.  
 For Romantics of this type, achieving freedom of the heart and 
of imagination is not simply a personal quest, but has universal 
significance, since by becoming inwardly free of the false 
constraints of culture and tradition one realizes the relativity 
of morality and opposes the oppression that moral regulation 
enforces on others.  As Hegel writes:  
`Reality is thus on the one hand a law by which the 
particular individuality is crushed and oppressed, a 
violent ordinance of the world which contradicts the law of 
the heart, and, on the other hand, a humanity suffering 
under that ordinance - a humanity which does not follow the 
law of the heart, but is subjected to an alien necessity' 
(Hegel 1967: 391).   
 To overcome the alien necessity of the world, the Romantic (in 
eighteenth century and postmodern guise alike) believes in the 
power of the creative realization of the inner self.  In the 
contemporary idiom, this is precisely the struggle to transcend 
boundaries and to move beyond the particular cultural 
contingencies that enchain the free play of the imagination.  
Again, the actual content of this imaginative play cannot be 
described - this would restrict freedom and the creative play of 
the aesthetic impulse, which is an absolute good not only for 
oneself, but for all humanity.   
 Unhappily, despite its emancipatory thrust, the law of the heart 
contains deep contradictions.  In the first place, it tends to 
ignore or negate the objective reality of human cruelty and 
violence - the `slaughter bench' of history, as Hegel called it.  
If recognized at all, oppression and brutality are automatically 
taken to be a consequence of authority and elitism, of enforced 
boundaries that divide persons, and of the oppressive weight of 
an inhumane enlightenment science.  Get rid of these, and human 
beings will spontaneously realize themselves in a joyful mutual 
recognition of one another's worth.   
 Of course, it would be pleasant indeed to believe that a new, 
liberating anthropology will indeed actually free us to take on 
different roles in the polyglot border crossings of a porous, 
playful and decentered postmodern world.  However, it is highly 
unlikely that objective realities of authority, distinction, 
opposition or science will vanish in the near future, and 
neither pious hopes nor intellectual gambits will make them 
disappear any the quicker.  Nor is it likely that anthropology  
now or in the any foreseeable future can have anything more than 
the most peripheral role in liberating the consciousness of 
either the rulers or the masses. 
 More to the point, even were social conditions to favor its 
adoption, the postmodernist motivational model does not offer 
any alternative moral base upon which we can erect a plausible 
opposition to the hegemony of Western values and institutions, 
if we in fact agree they deserve to be abolished or superceded.  
For one thing, as already noted, the high-sounding goals of 
tolerance, reciprocity, freedom, pluralism, creativity, 
equality, and self-expansion pursued by postmodernists are in 
fact the standard goals of Western liberal society itself, and 
are not alternatives at all.  Secondly, these goals are without 
substantive content.  Rather, they are grounded in a faith that 
has as its sole motivating credo the rejection of restraint and 
authority of all sorts:  `The realization of the immediate 
undisciplined nature passes for a display of excellence and for 
bringing about the well-being of mankind' (Hegel 1967: 392).  
From this stance, choice becomes the greatest of all goods, 
since we ought to be free to become whatever appeals to us, with 
the only caveat being that we must give others equivalent 
freedom. But how do we know what we wish to be?  Only ever more 
free, more tolerant, more creative.  The endless demands for 
contentless amplification must end in the desperate desire 
simply to be more - to absorb the world !   Thus Hegel's joke 
about black cows in the night is also a warning about the loss 
of self in the abyss of desire without limit or content. 
 Such an extreme overvaluaation of individual choice presupposes 
that the laws, customs and necessities of the world are, in 
their very essence, obstacles to freedom.  Worse, the desires of 
others, insofar as they do not immediately reflect or augment 
the desires of the expansive self, are felt to be alien and 
destructive, so that the lovers of absolute freedom and 
tolerance angrily strive to sublate and cancel the reluctant 
others who do not accept their visions of the world.  As Hegel 
writes: `The heart-throb for the welfare of mankind passes 
therefore into the rage of frantic self-conceit' (Hegel 
1967:397).   The ultimate logical consequence of the law of the 
heart is, paradoxically, narrow-mindedness and a self-righteous 
war of the conquering feeling self against the world.  That many 
who hold this belief system are themselves liberal, tolerant and 
kindly does not obviate this logic; it only shows that human 
beings are not logical. 
Anomie and the Intellectuals 
 Let me conclude by attempting, in the mode of Hegel's 
historical anthropology, to demonstrate the connection between 
postmodern idealism and present social conditions. Of course, 
the dream of liberation from the constraints of culture and its 
mores through the playful exercise of the creative imagination 
has a long history that can be traced to Gnostic roots.  But the 
proximate historical source lies in the gradual erosion of the 
traditions of the European world by the forces of modernity, a 
process which, as Hegel remarks, left people searching for `the 
restoration of that sense of solidity and substantiality of 
existence' that had been lost (Hegel 1967: 72).  
 The advances of Enlightenment science, Hegel saw, did not offer 
the certainty that had irretrievably vanished with the 
disintegration of the stable worlds of the past.  As a result, 
there was a wide-spread revulsion against the fragmentation and 
soullessness of the Enlightenment project.  People desired `to 
run together what thought has divided asunder... and restore the 
feeling of existence' (Hegel 1967: 72 emphasis in the original).   
In other words, the embrace of experience as a value in itself 
that is so characteristic of romanticism and postmodernism is a 
predictable consequence of the disenchantment and disintegration 
of the world that goes hand in hand with modernity.  Romantic 
thinkers responding to this new reality denied the validity of 
systematic thought and the objective limits of a newly 
contingent and partial external universe in order to search for 
ultimate meaning within themselves, in their own aesthetic 
sensations and reactions. 
 The dissolution of limits and distinctions and the free 
expansion of the creative self that constitute the law of the 
heart also has a sociological name: anomie - a state in which 
there is no legitimate end to one's desire, no goal, no 
conclusion.  As opposed to alienation, which is a crisis of 
social disintegration that ensues with the collapse of the 
traditional order, anomie occurs when the moral regulative power 
of society is dissolved by the explosive multiplication of the 
goods produced by a capitalist economy. In this situation, 
people who have already lost their social roots begin to believe 
they are creating themselves through their own successes in the 
ever-expanding marketplace.  They learn to value novelty and 
freedom of choice above all, despising any form of constraint on 
their capacity to make selections from a constantly changing 
menu of goods and values which the economy labors to produce, 
multiply and distribute. 
 Without moral limits on production and consumption, the 
proliferation of merchandise breeds an endless accumulative 
frenzy.  The psychology of this condition, a prerequisite for 
successful capitalism, has been classically outlined by 
Durkheim, who observed that, under anomic conditions, `the more 
one has, the more one wants, since satisfactions received only 
stimulate instead of filling needs' (1951: 247).  Where the 
continual expansion of one's desires becomes the highest goal, 
craving replaces ethics, since one finds one's value and 
identity through appetite and consumption. This is the systemic 
source of what MacIntyre (1981) has called the dominant 
philosophy of our time: `emotivism' - a reliance on personal 
desire as the sole incentive for action. The postmodern image of 
individuals as artists manufacturing their own identities is 
therefore not a critical negation of capitalism, but its 
reflection and apotheosis - a point made with great theoretical 
sophistication by Harvey (1989). 
 According to Durkheim's argument our age is not the age of 
liberation, but of the absence of goals and limits, and it is 
precisely this absence which drives the entrepreneurial cycle of 
never-ending capitalist expansion.  In this demanding 
environment the intellectual does not stand apart.  Rather, 
academics are required to be among the most enterprising of 
entrepreneurs, manufacturing `cutting-edge' theoretical 
arguments to accumulate ephemeral positions of status and power 
in the fast-paced and ever-changing marketplace of ideas.  
Anomic anxiety is heightened by the inherent instability of 
academic authority: while entrepreneurs can know their position 
vis-a-vis their competitors by simply comparing bank accounts, 
scholars have no objective markers by which to measure 
themselves or decide how the future will evaluate their work, 
nor can they ever achieve enough absolutely to ensure an 
irrefutable place in their discipline. Never secure in their 
reputations, constantly in need of new intellectual ammunition, 
running hard to keep up with constantly shifting fashions, some 
academics are understandably attracted to a postmodern ideology 
that places a premium on the absolute power of interpretation to 
manufacture and even liberate the world.   
 From this new perspective the crumbling of the grand regulatory 
structures of the Enlightenment is viewed as praiseworthy.  
These old restrictive forms will be replaced, it is hoped, by a 
festival of multiple circulating fictions, lacking coherence and 
without legitimacy. In the new world of liberated imagination, 
fact and fantasy mingle; according to Baudrillard (1986), 
sentimentality and nostalgia become the only emotions possible 
in the postmodern age, while kitsch and pastiche are the 
appropriate forms of art.  Ironic and bemused intellectuals and 
aesthetes are the central figures in this universe of the 
future; they put on their varied carnival masks in order to 
celebrate the end of history, the collapse of all norms, and the 
triumph of multiplicity and creativity. According to postmodern 
thought, the anomic world is a world of whimsy and play among 
the ruins of old certainties. 
 Unhappily, the newspaper headlines do not bear out this halcyon 
vision.  Instead of being made up of infinite and ultimately 
interchangeable cultural texts playfully rearranged and 
represented by amused and amusing academics, the real world 
appears to be largely populated by people whose motivations are 
far less refined.  Perhaps, in fact, the much-desired present-
day disintegration of the old markers of cultural and moral 
significance and the escalation of mass violence are not 
unrelated.  As Arendt prophetically warned, instead of being 
amused, real people are far more likely to be enraged and 
bewildered when `the distinction between fact and fiction... and 
the distinction between true and false... no longer exist' 
(Arendt 1968:172).   
 Without a moral base, without faith in reason, and without the 
limits imposed by traditional social relationships, atomized 
human beings may not celebrate their new amorphousness by 
participating in a wonderful orgy of aesthetic reinterpretation, 
but rather they are far more likely to become `one great 
unorganized, structureless mass of furious individuals' (Arendt 
1968: 13).  The paradigm case is the rise of Nazism, where a 
whole nation of people immersed themselves in an all-
encompassing social movement that offered them both absolute 
rules to follow and scapegoats to slaughter.  For Arendt, as for 
many other observers, the 20th century specter of ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, racism and the pervasive brutality of 
tyrannical regimes correlates with a deep popular hunger for 
standards to replace those traditions and identities that have 
been lost in a chilling amoral universe.  
 The reason for such a reaction is clear enough. As Hegel knew, 
human beings have a deeply rooted existential need to posit 
identities for themselves; to distinguish themselves from 
outsiders and simultaneously to find a kinship with those who 
are deemed closest.  It is only through a process of 
manufacturing differentiation and resemblance that we constitute 
ourselves and others in a moral human community.  Such a 
dialectical construction of identity is necessarily fraught with 
anxiety and ambivalence and often may erupt in hostility, as 
`we' seek to envelop ` them', or vice versa.   But the dialectic 
of self and other, we and they, is nonetheless constitutive of 
both subjectivity and collectivity.  The erosion of identities 
occuring today, I have argued, is not liberating, but 
terrifying, and is likely to lead to a heightened desire for 
reintegration, often at any cost, and thus to increased violence 
against enemies accused of breaking apart the community. The 
ideology of postmodernism reflects our contemporary disrupted 
state of being, but in doing so without a critical perspective 
it mistakes the nature of the human condition, and promises joy 
where there is little to be found. x 
 If the postmodern celebration of the unfettered individual has 
its moral and psychological pitfalls, what then remains?  
Perhaps we are left only with the cold comfort of science and 
Enlightenment rationality - an ideal without much passionate 
intensity, but at least one we can rely upon.  Whether this 
ideal offers us solace for life's trials is a matter only 
individuals can decide; but at any rate it has the advantage of 
undermining the belief that we are the centers of the universe - 
a delusion which, it seems, has reappeared in the moral 
certainties of the contemporary solipsistic sensibility of 
postmodernism.   
 At the same time, perhaps it is possible for our discipline to 
give more credit to the human urge for transcendence.  Though we 
cannot and ought not make any claims to offer realization of 
that ultimate goal ourselves, we can rightly consider our 
enterprize as a step along the way, since our task is to study 
and debate exactly what the conditions of human life actually 
are, both in their cross-cultural multiplicity, and also in 
their universal existential reality.  It is a task that requires 
a willingness to argue about what it means to be a human being.  
That is what this paper has attempted to do. 
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i Of course, a postmodernist might well argue that there is no 
archetypical postmodernist, only a multiplicity of personal perspectives, and 
that my very attempt to categorize reveals my inability to grasp 
multivocality.  But that claim would simply validate mine. 
ii It is hard to say what such an ethnography would look like. Perhaps it 
would consist of vagrant snippets of texts, jokes, and ruminations collected 
at random, as fragmented and compelling as a Menippean satire - but so far 
such a text remains a dream - a utopian dream for postmodernists and perhaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
something of a nightmare for those less enthusiastic about the new age.  Of 
course, someone would have to compile such a collection and make choices as 
to arrangement, so the problem of agency can never be wholly submerged, 
unless arbitrary selections by a computer can eventually substitute for 
authorial taste.   
iii In this shifting and unreliable environment, even personal identity 
becomes highly problematic and contingent. Hence the contemporary 
anthropological interest in the vague notion of culturally construed selves - 
forgetting the fact that construal is an interpretive act that requires a 
critical active agent as well as a text to be construed. 
iv  An image made more specific in the works of Baudrillard (1986) and 
Lyotard (1984). 
v Oddly, Shweder takes Nietzsche as the figure representative of the 
triumph of analytic and reductionist Enlightenment thought - surely one of 
the least likely individuals in Western history to be put into that 
particular role!   
vi See Geertz (1988) for the paradigmatic statement of this perspective, 
and Gellner (1992) for a response. 
vii This famous example is taken from Heidegger (1962:95-99). 
viii Of course, culture and context can alter recognition of such objects.  
For instance, apples may be forbidden fruits, or not recognized as edible, 
but such facts do not alter the basic point that knowledge is motivated not 
random. 
ix See Shweder (1984).  I am not claiming here that Hegel should be taken 
as an exemplar for future anthropological research, only that his 
psychological insights have relevance for the point I wish to make.  Hegel 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
himself was deeply Romantic in the sense that he sought a transcendental 
synthesis of human experience through his philosophical system.  His portait 
of the pitfalls of Romanticism developed from his arguments against his more 
mystically inclined contemporaries.  For him, the triumph of the Spirit was 
conducted within, not outside, the trajectory of history, and is an 
apotheosis of the power of reason and systematic thought within the context 
of culture.  Hegel was also especially critical, as we shall see, of thinkers 
who remained insensitive to the suffering and struggle of what he called the 
"Golgotha" of the human spirit.  See Abrams (1971) for more on Hegel and his 
relationship to other Romantic writers.  
x For more on this see Lindholm (1990).  I should make it clear here that 
I am far from claiming that people with firm identities and strong cultural 
traditions are pacifists, or that nationalistic wars and ethnic hatred are 
postmodern inventions.  My point is that the undermining of identities is as 
dangerous as, if not more dangerous than, the  essentializing of them, and 
that the latter is in fact very often a reaction to the former. 
